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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is proper according to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)
(2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err when it held that Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Nichols did
not have the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion when he made a traffic stop of Guy
Montoya's car?
In evaluating a trial court's findings of facts underlying a motion to dismiss the
standard of review is whether the trial court made a "clear error" in its decision. State v.
Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) Although the Court of Appeals gives some
"measure of discretion" to the trial court's application of those facts to the law, whether
or not there is reasonable articulable suspicion for a stop is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. Id.
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
The issues presented for review were preserved by oral argument to the trial court
as shown by the transcript of the motion hearing. (R. 367, Addendum A pp. 19-20).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69 is the determinative statute at issue in this case. The text of
the statute is listed below in its entirety.
(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left
on a roadway or change lanes until the movement can be
4

made with reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has
been given.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change
lanes shall be given continuously for at least the last three
seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or change.
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed
of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal to the
operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is
opportunity to give a signal.
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 41-6-70
may not be flashed on one side only on a disabled vehicle,
flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to operators of other
vehicles approaching from the rear, or flashed on one side
only of a parked vehicle except as necessary to comply with
this section.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
On October 31, 2003 at about 11:03 p.m. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Mark
Nichols made a traffic stop of the car driven by the Defendant/Appellee, Guy Montoya, at
approximately 938 South Washington Street in Salt Lake City. (R. 367, Addendum A p.
4.) The reason Trooper Nichols made the stop of Mr. Montoya's car was that he saw Mr.
Montoya move out of the regular lane of travel and pull over to the curb without
signaling. (Id. at p. 5.)
Mr. Montoya was charged in the Salt Lake City Justice Court with Count 1
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44 and
Count 2 Failure to Signal in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-69. (R. 1). Mr. Montoya moved to
suppress evidence in the justice court (R. 45-50), an evidentiary hearing was held, and the
court denied the motion to suppress. (R. 51-58). Mr. Montoya was convicted of both

5

counts after a jury trial in the justice court. (R. 129-132). Mr. Montoya subsequently
appealed the conviction to the Third District Court. (R. 275-280).
At the Third District Court Mr. Montoya again moved to suppress evidence. (R.
347-353) After an evidentiary hearing and legal argument, the trial court found that
U.C.A. §41-6-69 was ambiguous (R. 367, Addendum A p. 23), and that there was no
evidence of impairment or any other reason to pull Mr. Montoya over and granted the
motion to suppress all evidence arising out of the stop. (Id.) After the motion hearing the
court apparently made a sua sponte motion to dismiss, because although there was no
motion made by either side, the Court's minute entry indicates that the case was
dismissed. (R. 358-359, Addendum B p. 7) The case is now before this Court on the
City's appeal of the trial court's decision.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Trooper Nichols made a valid traffic stop of Mr. Montoya's car when he stopped
him for failing to signal before leaving his travel lane to move to the curb to park. Mr.
Montoya's actions violated the plain language of U.C.A. §41-6-69 which requires a driver
to signal before moving right or left upon a roadway. Additionally, despite the trial
court's decision that the statute is ambiguous, Trooper Nichols did rely on and was
entitled to rely on the plain language of the statute in effect at the time.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT TROOPER NICHOLS DID
NOT HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP
MR. MONTOYA WAS AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW.

"A police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is
incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence." State v Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Pursuant to the Utah Traffic Code in effect at the time of
the stop, "a person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or change
lanes until.. .an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section." Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-69 (emphasis added). The Traffic Code defines the "roadway" as the
"portion of highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-1(41).
In State v. Preece, the Court held where the trooper saw the defendant pull off to the
right side of the road and then reenter without using a turn signal, that the trooper "had
probable cause—more than the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion—to stop
Preece." 971 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The Court found that the stop did not
violate the defendants Fourth Amendment rights. Id. Preece's action of leaving the lane
of travel to pull to the right side of the road was defined by the Court as "movfing] right
or left upon a roadway or changing] lanes." Id.
The Federal Court of Appeals referring to the two statues above stated, "although the
government argues that merging is the only possible application of the 'move right or left'
7

portion of the statute, other applications are possible. A vehicle may pull off the roadway
onto the shoulder.. .this situation also involves a 'move right or left' where the statute
would apply and requires signaling." U.S. v. Gregorie, 425 F.3d 872, 878 (10th Cir. Utah
2005).
In a similar case, US. v. Parker, the Highway Patrol Trooper observed a vehicle move
from the travel lane into the emergency lane without the use of a turn-signal. 72 F.3d
1444, 1449 (10th Cir Utah 1995). The Court found that the Trooper had witnessed a
traffic violation and could make a constitutionally valid stop. The Court supported the
traffic violation by applying § 41-6-69(l)(a) which states "A person may not turn a
vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until... an appropriate signal
has been given." (Repealed and renumbered as §41-6a-804). The court went on to state
that, "[i]t is irrelevant whether: (1) the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine
according to the general practice of the police department or the particular officer making
the stop; and (2) the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping the
vehicle." Parker, 72 F.3d at 1449.
In this case Mr. Montoya left the roadway without signaling and pulled to the right
onto the shoulder to park his vehicle. (R. 367, Addendum A at page 5.) This required him
to move his vehicle from the roadway and a, unmarked lane of travel to the shoulder of
the road which is outside the lane of travel. (Id.) This move to the right without signaling
violates the statute according to the Court in Gregorie, 425 F.3d at 878, and is very
similar to the facts found in Preece to be a violation of law. 971 P.2d at 5. According to
8

the plain reading of the statute when Mr. Montoya changed or moved his vehicle from the
lane of travel onto the far right shoulder in order to park at the curb, the ordinance
requires he use his signal.
Instead of making an analysis of whether Mr. Montoya's driving constituted a
violation of the applicable statute, the trial court made a cursory finding that the statute
was ambiguous and subsequently declined to do any further analysis with regard to
whether or not Montoya's conduct was a violation of law. (R. 367, Addendum A p. 23.)
Because of the court's expressed belief that the statute is "ambiguous" and by implication
therefore unconstitutional, the court subsequently ignored the question of whether the
trooper had witnessed a violation of law. (Id.) Instead the trial court turned its attention to
whether or not Mr. Montoya was impaired or had "impaired anybody" else with his
driving. (Id.) The trial court was apparently persuaded that the trooper was enforcing the
law too vigorously because it suggested that perhaps if this occurred on State Street there
would be a violation but not on a quiet residential street where it does not impair anyone.
(Id.) This analysis is improper. The traffic code applies whether a driver is on a high
traffic roadway such as State Street or on a "quiet residential street." The statute
requiring a signal does not say that the signal is only a requirement when the movement
may impede another driver.
Because Trooper Nichols witnessed Mr. Montoya drive his car in a way that violated
the plain meaning of the law, he was constitutionally permitted to make a stop of Mr.
Montoya. The trial court's belief that the law was ambiguous and unconstitutional which
9

led to its failure to apply the law to the facts of the case was erroneous and should be
reversed.
II.

BECAUSE TROOPER NICHOLS RELIED IN GOOD FAITH ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE § 41-6-69, EVIDENCE
GATHERED FROM THE TRAFFIC STOP OF MR. MONTOYA SHOULD
NOT BE SUPPRESSED.
There is no dispute that Mr. Montoya failed to use his vehicle's turn signal or to

make any other appropriate signal to indicate that he was pulling to the side of the road to
park. Trooper Nichols initiated a traffic stop based on his observation of a violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69 which states: "A person may not turn a vehicle or move right
or left on a roadway or change lanes until the movement can be made with reasonable
safety; and an appropriate signal has been given under this section." Notwithstanding the
lower court's finding that § 41-6-69 is ambiguous and therefore unconstitutional, the
traffic stop in the instant case is lawful because Trooper Nichols relied on the statute in
good faith.
A. A stop or arrest made pursuant to a law enforcement officer's good faith
reliance on a statute not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless
of a subsequent judicial determination of its constitutionality.
The traffic stop in the instant case is valid in that Utah Code § 41-6-69 is not
clearly unconstitutional, and therefore, Trooper Nichols "cannot be expected to question
the judgment of the legislature that passed the law." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 34950 (1987) ("Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to
question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law."); see also United States v.
10

Vanness, 342 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that "'a law enforcement officer'
could have 'acted in good-faith reliance upon" the 'Unreasonable Noise' ordinance
because 'its provisions are such that a reasonable officer' would not have 'known that the
statute was unconstitutional.'")
In Illinois v. Krull the defendants were arrested and charged with various criminal
violations of Illinois' motor vehicle statutes after a police detective discovered that
several vehicles in the wrecking yard were stolen. 480 U.S. at 343-44. The defendants
moved to suppress the seized evidence arguing that the Illinois statute that allowed the
detective unbridled discretion in their searches was unconstitutional. Id. at 344.
The United States Supreme Court in Krull reversed the Illinois Supreme Court
ruling granting the defendant's motion to suppression. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained by police
who acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing the warrantless
search, but which was subsequently found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 349355; see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) ("The subsequently
determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance on vagueness grounds does not undermine
the validity of the arrest made for violation of that ordinance, and the evidence discovered
in the search of respondent should not have been suppressed.") The Krull Court noted
that the statute was not clearly unconstitutional and, therefore, the detective was not
expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law. Id. at 358-359.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this same issue in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d
11

446, 452 (Utah 1995), holding that bi[aJ stop or arrest made pursuant to an officer's good
faith reliance on an ordinance not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a
subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality." See also Utah v. Lambeth,
2005 UT App 289 (June 23, 2005) (unpublished opinion) ("[A]n officer acts in good faith
merely by applying the statute as written, unless the statute is 'so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its
flaws.5") In Chapman, the defendant was arrested for violating a Salt Lake County
loitering ordinance and was subsequently charged with one count of burglary and two
counts of theft. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered after his
initial detention arguing the constitutionality of the County ordinance. The trial court
denied the defendant's motion. On appeal, this Court did not reach the issue of the
constitutionality of the loitering ordinance, but found that the officers could reasonably
rely on the ordinance because it had not yet been declared unconstitutional.
The defendant argued on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court that the ordinance was
unconstitutional and its unconstitutionality should have been obvious to the officers,
therefore the officers could not properly rely on it to detain him. The Utah Supreme
Court ruled, however, that
[p]olice are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared
unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by
enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality—with the possible
exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person
of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.
Id. at 451-452.
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In the present case, Trooper Nichol's initial contact with Mr. Montoya was
justified. Trooper Nichols conducted a traffic stop on Mr. Montoya based on a violation
of a section of the Utah Code which was valid at the time of the stop. The state trooper
was acting in good faith by applying § 41-6-69 as written, and the statute is not %tso
grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be
bound to see its flaws." Lambeth, 2005 UT App 289 *3-4; quoting DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
31,38. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that Trooper Nichols had any
knowledge that this statute was or had been declared unconstitutional.
Thus, even though §41-6-69 was found by the trial court to be ambiguous, the
traffic stop and subsequent arrest in this case are valid based on Trooper Nichol's good
faith reliance on the statute. As the Utah Supreme Court has held, "a stop or arrest made
pursuant to an officer's good faith reliance on an ordinance not yet declared
unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a subsequent judicial determination of its
constitutionality." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452.
CONCLUSION
Trooper Nichols had the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion to make a
traffic stop of Mr. Montoya's car when he stopped him for failing to signal before leaving
his travel lane to move to the curb to park. Mr. Montoya's actions violated the plain
language of §41-6-69 which requires a driver to signal before moving right or left upon a
roadway. Additionally, despite the trial court's decision that the statute is ambiguous,
Trooper Nichols did rely on and was entitled to rely on the plain language of the statute in
13

effect at the time. Therefore the decision of the trial court suppressing evidence and
dismissing the case should be reversed and the case should be reinstated and remanded
for further proceedings.
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P R 0 C E E D I N G S

2

(El.ectronically recor ded on August 10, 2006)

3

THE COURT: Montoya.

4

MR. FLATER

5

MR. ARCHULETA: He is.

6

MR. FLATER

7

THE COURT: Okay, is thLe City may proceeci.

8

MR. FLATER

9

THE COURT: All right, you may call your first witness.

10
11

Is he here>, Rob?
Mr. Montoya.

You can come on up here •

Yes, your Honor.

MR. FLATER: Thank you, your Honor.

The City calls

Trooper Mark Nichols.

12

THE COURT: Will you come forward and be sworn.

13

COURT CLERK: Okay, will you raise your right hand.

Do

14

you affirm that the testimony you shall give in this case shall

15

be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, under

16

the pains and penalties of perjury?

17

THE WITNESS: Yes.

18

COURT CLERK: Thank you.

19

THE COURT: All right, if you'd take the stand, please.

20

Make yourself comfortable.

21

MR. FLATER: Just preliminarily, your Honor, for

22

the benefit of guiding this testimony a little bit, as I

23

understand the motion we're looking at the stop and the

24

reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop of defendant

25

on that matter?

-41

THE COURT: That's my understanding.

2

MR. ARCHULETA: That's the —

3

THE COURT: Probable cause to the initial stop, right?

4

MR. ARCHULETA: That is correct, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Okay, all right.

6

MARK NICHOLS,

7

having been first duly sworn,

8

testifies as follows:

9

DIRECT EXAMINATION

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

BY MR. FLATER:
Q.

Trooper Nichols, would you please state your full name

and experience for the Court?
A.
Patrol.
Q.

Mark Nichols.

I'm a Sergeant with Utah Highway

I've been on the Highway Patrol for nine years now.
Okay, and on October 31st, 2003 what were you doing on

that evening?

17

A.

I was on patrol in Salt Lake City.

18

Q.

Okay, and what were your duties that night?

19

A.

I was stopping cars and issuing citations to

20

violators.

21

MR. ARCHULETA: I'm sorry, due to violations?

22

THE WITNESS: Yes.

23
24
25

Q.

BY MR

FLATER: Were you in the approximate location of

938 South and Washington Street at about 11 o'clock that night?
A.

Yes.

-51 I

Q.

Can you tell me what you observed at that location?

2 I

A.

Yes.

3
4
5
6

I observed a pick-up truck that did not use his

signal when he pulled to the side of the road.
Q.

Okay.

Now, is that the first time that you'd seen

that pick-up truck at that location?
A.

I had —

no, excuse me.

I had seen the pick-up truck

7

two to three blocks prior to where the pick-up truck actually

8

pulled over to the side of the road.

9

Q.

Okay, and when you describe pulling over to the side

10

of the road, can you describe that in more detail for the

11

Court?

12

A.

Yes.

As the pick-up truck was driving down Washington

13

Street, he then moved over to the curb as to park.

14

other —

15

spot for him to park.

16

right, and parked alongside the curb.

17
18

Q.

other place —

There was

or other cars parked, and there was a
He moved from the travel lane to the

And how far behind him were you at the time when he

made that maneuver?

19

A.

Oh, I would say 50 feet —

20

Q.

Okay, and once again, your reason for stopping him was

21
22

50-plus feet.

what?
A.

He actually stopped before I activated my lights; and

23

after he had stopped, he did not —

when —

before he moved to

24

the right of the roadway, he did not use his signal.

25

the reason why I activated my lights on my patrol car and made

That's

- 6-

1

2
3

contact with the driver.
Now, is it your understanding that the maneuver that

Q.

was made by the driver is a violation of State Law?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And what law is it that he violated?

A.

The code number, actually, or the —

itself says that —

the violation

or the law states that you must use your

signal for three seconds prior to any lane change or turning or

9

moving right or left upon a roadway.

10
11

MR. ARCHULETA: Can you give me that statute number for
that, Trooper?

12

THE WITNESS: I don't have that right here with me.

13

MR. FLATER: I' ve got a copy of the version that was in

14

effect •

-

15

MR. ARCHULETA: Just give me the code number.

16

MR. FLATER: It is 40 —

17

The curr ent version

18

changed —

19
20

41-6-69 in the prior version

— and I don't think the language has

41-6(a)-805, I believe.

MR. ARCHULETA: That' s correct, and the language hasn rt
been amended r your Hono r.

21

THE COURT: It' s 41 -

22

MR. ARCHULETA: Oh, I 'm sorry.

23

MR. FLATER: It 's 41- 6(a)-805.

24

THE COURT: Okay.

25

MR. ARCHULETA: It's 804, actually, your Honor.

-71

THE COURT: It's 804, okay.

2

MR. FLATER: Oh, 804.

3

THE COURT: All right, I have it.

4

Okay.
You can go ahead.

You can keep going.

5

MR. FLATER: Okay.

With my understanding of what we're

6

here for today, your Honor, I believe that the facts leading up

7

to the stop have been, I guess, sufficiently established by the

8

City.

9

issue right now.

I don't have any other further questions regarding that

10

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

11

MR. ARCHULETA: Yes.

12

THE COURT: —

13

MR. ARCHULETA: Thank you.

14
15
16
17

Cross examination

—

Mr. Archuleta.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. ARCHULETA:
Q.

Yes.

Trooper Nichols, I wonder if you'd tell me what

your badge number is?

18

A.

My badge number currently?

19

Q.

Yeah, yeah.

20

A.

It's 254.

21

Q.

Was it different back in October 31st of 2003?

22

A.

It was.

23

Q.

What was the number then, if you recall?

24

A.

We've changed a couple

25

Q.

It may be on your citation.

—

-81

A.

I don't recall.

2

Q.

All right.

We've changed a few times since then.

Now, in f act, would it be true to state

3

that you are in a specialized DUI task force; that you were

4

part of 3. task force member to identify --

5

A.

At that time yes.

6

Q.

—

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Okay, and i t would be f a i r t o say t h a t y o u ' v e

9
10

impaired drivers?

t r a i n i n g t o f i n d f a c t s t h a t would s u g g e s t an i n d i v i d u a l
driving

taken
is

impaired?

11

A.

As —

12

Q.

As part of your training?

13

A.

As part of my training as a police officer, yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

I'm wrong —

Now, on this particular night —

at 8th —

correct me if

8th South runs east and west?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Okay, and Washington runs north and south.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Washington —

20
21
22

would it be fair to characterize that as

a small older residential street?
A.

It is a residential street?

Whatever you consider

small, it is a --

23

Q.

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Okay.

Older homes?

There's no divided line between the left and
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right lane

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

—

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

Now, on this particular night when you saw the vehicle

6

—

on that street?

So it's just a residential street?

you weren't actually parked at a location; were you not?

7

A.

I d o n ' t r e c a l l i f I was parked or d r i v i n g .

8

Q.

Okay, and you d o n ' t have any r e c o l l e c t i o n of ever

9

t e s t i f y i n g t h a t you were parked?

10

A.

I don't.

11

Q.

Do you have any recollection of ever stating that you

12

saw him approximately on 400 West, is when you commenced to

13

follow him?

Would that sound --

14

A.

That's when I first noted that I saw the vehicle, yes.

15

Q.

Okay, and he was driving an older truck?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Didn't your report indicate that that was an '8 9, I

18

believe , Ford pick-up t ruck?

19

A.

A ^78 —

20

Q.

There you go.

21

A.

A *78 Chev.

22

Q.

Okay, pick-up truck.

Thank you.

Okay.

Now, when you saw that

23

vehicle first, did you see any equipment violat ions at a 11,

24

a taillight or anything at all to suggest that there was a

25

problem with that car?

-101

A.

No.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

Equipment-wise, no.

4

Q.

Okay, and there was — you never did discover an

5

equipment violation, did you?

9

A.

No.

Q.

Okay, never cited for one?

A.

Right.

Q.

When you first observed that vehicle, your police

10

report doesn't indicate that that vehicle was speeding, going

11

over or under the speed limit in a way that was unsafe for

12

other drivers?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

Is that correct?

15

A.

Correct.

16
17

yuu

18

Testing?

iiiciy

IlctV«

U5«U,

LIldL

S

UctJ__LtJU

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Okay, and i n terms of

21

i s i t not,

22

an impai r e d d r i v e r ?

O L d l l U ci-LUJL Z t i U

ritilU

v e h i c l e i n motion,

it

OUUL -LtJLy

is true,

t h a t y o u ' r e t r a i n e d t o look f o r c e r t a i n s i g n s as t o

23

A.

They —

24

Q.

And h i s d r i v i n g

25

A.

That was d i s c u s s e d whether

pattern?
t h a t ' s a d i r e c t manner of
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1

training.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

I guess that's subject to the officer receiving the

4

training.

5

Q.

Okay.

Well, did you (inaudible) driving in terms of

6

vehicle detection such as weaving, things like that, that may

7

suggest he was an impaired driver?

8

A.

Yes, I have seen those.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

Those training manuals.

11

Q.

So now correct me if I'm wrong, he turned right onto

12

Washington Street from 800 South?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

In that regard your report doesn't indicate

anywhere that there was a turning violation, does it?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

So in regard to the turn, then, would it be fair to

18

presume that he signaled for three seconds and made a lawful

19

right-hand turn?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

Now, in regard t o turns generally, one indication of

22

an impaired driver would be a wide radius turn; would it not?

23

A.

That could be an indication.

24

Q.

Okay, and that's nowhere on your DUI report form is

25

it?
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A.

Correct.

2

Q.

Does your report (inaudible) that in terms of other

3

signs, for example, that he may have straddled a lane or center

4

lane in terms of his travel?

5

A.

No, sir.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

Nowhere indicates that he hit a lane mark or

anything like that to suggest he was impaired?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

Does it indicate in terms of erratic driving that he

10

may have almost hit another vehicle?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

Indicate anywhere that he was weaving as you

were traveling down the road?

14

A.

No.

15

Q-

Would you answer "no," or "yes" or "no," I'm sorry.

16

A.

I said, "No."

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

I'm sorry.

19

Q.

Okay, and I'm sorry.

20

A.

I'11 speak up.

21

Q.

I apprec —

yeah, thank you.

I'll apologize.

I

22

didn't mean to be pushy on that, by the way.

23

indicat e that he was traveling in other than his designated

24

lane?

25

A.

No.

Does your report
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2

Q.

Okay.

So there was no evidence of swerving or abrupt

turning movements?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Okay, no indication he was traveling lower than a

5

lawful speed limit?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

What drew your attention —

lets go back to where you

8

first saw him.

9

factors that you can tell this Court, articulable suspicion

10

that he was —

11

What drew your attention, then, in terms of

that Mr. Montoya was an impaired driver?

Now, I'm not talking about the turn when he pulled

12

onto Washington.

13

when you first saw him and made a decision.

14

point.

15

vehicle?

16

I'm talking about the point prior to that,
It's the decision

Tell me why you made the decision to follow this

A.

It was a vehicle in my area, and I decided to follow

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

There was no --

20

Q.

No reason?

21

A.

No articuable suspection that he was under the

17

22
23
24
25

it.

influence at the time that I turned.
Q.

Okay.

So could have been Judge Fuchs, then, and you

would have followed his vehicle, as well as anyone else?
A.

Yes, sir.
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2

Q.

Do you customarily do that, just follow vehicles until

there's a traffic violation?

3

A.

In this case, two blocks, yes.

4

Q.

Okay, and so would it be your custom to follow a

5

vehicle until there is traffic violation and make a stop?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Was there any particular reason you made the decision

8

to follow him down a quiet residential street?

9

A.

No particular reason.

10

Q.

Okay.

Now, after we have the vehicle in motion,

11

sometimes the officer's trained to see how the stop was made.

12

In other words, an abrupt stop, something that suggests that

13

there's a problem here.

14

was any abrupt stopping motion?

Does your report indicate that there

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

No indication that the stopping what herky jerky,

17

you know, kind of like sometimes people stop a car that are

18

inexperienced or impaired?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

So there was no information on the report that he was

21

any danger to any pedestrian or any other driver this night?

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

Now —

oh, here we go.

moment, I'm looking for something.
A.

Okay.

If you just give me a
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2

Q.

You're aware t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l , i n o r d e r t o become a

l i c e n s e d d r i v e r , has t o t a k e a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e

test?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Okay, and the Drivers License Division makes available

5

to the public a Driver's Handbook?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Would it be fair to say that most individuals —

I

8

believe all, well, including myself -- have to study that in

9

order to pass that examination?

10

A.

To a certain point yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

Now, I wonder if you would identify this

12

document.

13

tell me what that indicates that is, if you would?

You'll have to look on the first page of this and

14

MR. ARCHULETA: Judge, I have a copy for you.

15

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I object to the use of this

17

material inasmuch as it's

—

18

THE COURT: Overruled.

19

MR. FLATER: —

20

THE COURT: Overruled.

21

MR. FLATER: Okay.

22

THE COURT: I know what the law is.

23

MR. ARCHULETA: Yeah, if I may ask him some questions

24
25

not controlling.

Just go ahead.

about -THE COURT: You may.

. _J
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2

Q.

BY MR. ARCHULETA: Okay.

Now, would you identify this

document please?

3

A.

It says, "Utah Driver Handbook, July 2003."

4

Q.

Okay.

Now, I wonder if you would read this.

It has,

5

looks like, five Roman Numeral in turns and signaling.

6

wonder if you would read that, what it instructs people they're

7

required to do.

8
9

A.

Sure.

It says, "Signaling."

I

Do you want me to read

the whole thing?

10

Q.

Please.

11

A.

Okay.

"Signaling shall be given by the use of turn

12

signals, stops —

13

drivers always use signal, always signal their intentions well

14

in advance.

15

turning

16
17

Q.

stop lights, or your hand and arm.

Good

Signals are required for three seconds before

—"
Excuse me at that point; and that's exactly where you

said three seconds

—

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

-~ and that he gave the three-second turn turning onto

20

Washington Street, correct?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Please go on.

23

A.

For three seconds

24

Q.

Okay.

25

before beginning any lane change.

This was beginning any lane change.

there any marked lanes on Washington Street?

Now, were
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A.

There were no markings on the road.

2

Q.

Okay, please go on.

3

A.

—

4

Q.

Okay, does it —

5

would we —

6

I pulled away from the curb, then I'd be required to give a

7

signal?

"anytime you pull away from a curb."
now, pull away from a curb, presuming

would that mean that if I -- my car was parked, and

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

So other people could know.

Okay, tell if anywhere

10

in there it indicates that also that a driver is required to

11

signal prior to pull over to a curb?

12

A.

I could relate that to No. 2.

13

Q

Would you, please.

14

A.

For three seconds before beginning any lane change.

15

Q.

Okay, but m

Tell me what it says.

terms of curb, though, it doesn't say

—

16

it says "pulling away from curb;" doesn't say pulling over to

17

curb?

18

A.

No. 2 does not.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

No. 3 does, but No. 2 says beginning

21

Q.

Your testimony was is that he did not turn or change

22

lane.

23

curb; isn't that correct?

24
25

A.

—

You indicated that he moved over to park his car on the

Correct.

I testified that he moved from his —

the

travel lane, out of the travel lane, changed to the parking
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2
3

stall or the parking area to the curb.
Q.

But the adjective you used was not "turn," was "move,"

if I'm correct?

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

Okay, and so that would be fair that he moved his

Yeah, yeah.

6

vehicle, because a turn, would it not, mean going around a

7

radius of some type?

8

A.

It could mean that, yes.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

MR. ARCHULETA: Your Honor, I suppose in regards to

11

just the articulable suspicion whether it was a turn violation,

12

this is probably as far as I can go on this.

13

We spoke of that.

Actually, your Honor, I prepared a lengthy memorandum

14

arguing that the statute was ambiguous or vague.

15

there's really a number of sections; and m

16

reading, we felt it was ambiguous and perhaps unconstitutional.

17

It's because

terms of plain

I got here early, and the City indicated they would

18

move to dismiss.

Now, even if the Court was to dismiss the

19

turn violation, there still is the question whether there was

20

articulable suspicion for a traffic violation; but m

21

context I'm prepared to submit the matter to the Court.

that

22

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

23

MR. ARCHULETA: Your Honor, if I could make a few

24
25

closing arguments, perhaps?
THE COURT: Yeah, let me see if there's any --
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2

MR. ARCHULETA: I have no further questions.

Thank

you.

3

THE COURT: —

4

MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I don't have anything else.

5

THE COURT: All right.

6

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

7

THE COURT: Okay, argument from the City'?

8

MR. FLATER: Yes, your Honor.

9

redirect from the City?

You may step down.

A lot of the questioning

from the defense Counsel went to whether he had a reasonable

10

articulable suspicion that the driver was impaired; and he

11

never testified that he was impaired.

12

the sole reason was —

13

he observed a traffic violation, which was the defendant pulled

14

out of a lane of travel and parked his car along the curb.

15

In fac,t he testified

sole reason he stopped him was because

The plain language and the plain reading of the

16

statute specifically says that a person may not turn a vehicle,

17

or move right or left upon a road way, or change lanes until

18

the movement can be made with reasonable safety.

19

I think the language we need to focus on is the "or

20

move right or left upon a roadway."

21

this isn't a turn, and didn't consider it a turn; but did

22

consider it a movement upon the roadway.

23

that a signal be given for that type of movement.

24
25

He's acknowledged that

The statute requires

Because there wasn't a signal given, the officer
observed a traffic violation occur m

his presence.

Therefore
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it was proper for him to stop the vehicle.

2

regards to the driver's license —

3

indicates in there that the —

4

that a signal must be given.

One side note with

driver's license manual.

It

when pulling away from a curb,

5

When you read that in conjunction with the statute,

6

the statute never says specifically pulling away from a curb

7

you have to give a signal.

8

the driver's license book says by saying "moving right or left

9

upon a roadway."

10

In fact, the statute supports what

Typically pulling away from a curb is a movement right

11

upon the road way —

12

and pulling your car to the curb is a movement left upon the

13

roadway.

14

what controls.

15

language of that statute, the stop that the trooper made that

16

night was pr oper.

excuse me, movement left upon the roadway;

Regardless of what that manual says, the statute is
It's very clear, and according to the plain

17

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

18

Mr. Archuleta.

19

[ell, your Honor, to me it' s disturbing
MR. ARCHULETA: V>

20

that this man is trained to find impaired dr iver.

21

was nothing to indicate that Mr. Montoya was doing absolutely

22

anything ill egal.

23

proper, quot e, turn that is a round an axis, that th at turn was

24

made properly when he turned onto Washington Street •

25

There really

Indeeci his conduct in particular making a

Now , this whole idea that you have to sign al when
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moving your car to the left or right on a roadway takes on

2

certain ludicrous proportions, is because I don't think any of

3

us had the experience where we've seen vehicles driving down

4

the freeway and they actually move to the left or to the right,

5

and probably no more than what he described about moving his

6

vehicle to the curb.

7

I have yet to ever see a vehicle signal when —

or

8

myself when I'm moving down the roadway.

Now, changing lanes

9

is a completely different issue, but vehicles are weaving all

10

over the place in terms of (inaudible).

11

made in that situation.

12

can be extended to some ludicrous statements, as I believe I've

13

made.

14

You don't see signals

What I'm saying is, is that hypothetic

In my motion -- I haven't found a case yet that

15

defines what a turn is; and I looked and looked to see if I

16

could find something.

17

Oxford dictionary, or a good dictionary define what a turn is.

18

A turn really is when you make a turn around an axis.

19

So I made reference to —

I believe the

His own language was "moved his vehicle to the right."

20

The training handbook rightfully describes really what drivers

21

are required to do.

22

signal.

23

in context of pulling to the side of the road that this a

24

movement that requires a signal.

25

When they leave a curb, they have to

It doesn't say that in —

Counsel tried to drive it

This is a very, very quiet residential street.

His
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vehicle was stopped right at the he turned on his lights, so

2

it didn't even impair the safety of the officer.

3

was fishing for any excuse to investigate Mr. Montoya, really

4

without probable cause up to that point.

5

T

The question was does this constitute articulable

6

suspicion, and was it a violation under the law?

7

don't think it was.

8

Iwasaki.

9

and I disagreed with it.

10
11

He simply

I really

I know that we battled this before Judge

His reasoning somewhat supported what Counsel said,
I also felt that the statute was

ambiguous.
I prepared about a 12-page brief, came in, was

12

prepared to give to the Courts —

13

General, have the Court take a look at it.

14

"Let's dismiss the turn violation.

15

which is really a whole separate issue.

16

He was slightly over point — 0 . 8 .

17

there that I can address at trial, but for purposes of this,

18

that's where I stand, your Honor; and I appreciate your

19

attention.

20

THE COURT: Thank you.

give it to the Attorney
The City said,

We will address the DUI,"
They did a blood draw.

There may be some issues

I haven't had a chance to read

21

the briefs; and I understand Mr. Archuleta that what you do and

22

I do as driving don't necessarily make it right or wrong --

23

MR. ARCHULETA: Correct.

24

THE COURT: —

25

because we don't signal when we pull

over; but the Court finds that the officer is in a DUI

-231

enforcement mode.

2

time this occurred.

3

street.

4

anybody in any way, or any shape or form.

5

He worked for a special task force at the
This is a small, private residential

I've heard no evidence that this driver impaired

I don't think that the normal practice —

and this

6

is conjecture on the Court's part, but I've yet to ever see a

7

case m

8

refusing to use a turn signal on a private side street m

9

City.

20 years where any officer has ever pulled anybody for
the

It would be one thing if it was State Street and the

10

individual was trying to park and impeding traffic, but

11

this particular case I've heard nothing that this driver was

12

impaired or any probable cause to the stop, other than the turn

13

signal.

14

m

I think it's interesting the City's willing to dismiss

15

the turn signal charge and just go on the DUI.

16

statute to be ambiguous.

17

unsafe.

18

going to grant the motion to suppress.

I find the

I find his movements not to be

I find no other evidence of any impairment; and I'm

19

I think the officer's doing a good job; but this,

20

I think, might carry it just a little too far on a private

21

residential street, where it doesn't impair anybody, and the

22

individual pulls over to park his car.

23

anybody in this entire State put on their turn signal to do

24

that.

25

I have yet to see

If that's the law, then that may be the law and the
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1 I City can appeal it; but I agree with defense Counsel.

I find

2

no probable cause for this stop whatsoever; and I'm going to

3

grant you motion to suppress.

4

MR. ARCHULETA: Thank you, Judge.

5

THE COURT: You're welcome.

6

(Hearing concluded)
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12-05-05 Minute Entry - PRETRIAL CONFERENCE continued
Judge:
PAUL G MAUGHAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
cheril
Prosecutor: VEERU-COLLINGS, PADMA
Defendant
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Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA
Video
Tape Number:

Video

Tape Count: 2:19

CONTINUANCE
The Defendant's counsel Robert Archuleta has made a motion for
continuance of Pretrial Conference.
The motion is granted.
Reason for continuance:
More time needed
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 01/04/2006
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN
12-05-05 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Continued.
01-04-06 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on January 31, 2006 at 08:30 AM
in Third Floor - W37 with Judge MAUGHAN.
01-04-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
PAUL G MAUGHAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
cheril
Prosecutor: VEERU-COLLINGS, PADMA
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA
Video
Tape Number:

Video

Tape Count: 8:55

Defense counsel present motioning the court to set this matter for
a Motion to Suppress Hearing. Defense counsel will supplement the
motion already filed. Defense to have supplemental motion filed by
1-18-06 and the city to have response filed by
1-31-06.
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 01/31/2006
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W3 7
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN
01-04-06 Filed: Demand for Jury Trial (URCrP 17 (d)
01-27-06 Filed: Notice to Attorney General Constitutionality of A State
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Statute Has Been Raised & Notice of Right to Intervene
01-31-06 Charge 1 Disposition is Remanded
01-31-06 Charge 2 Disposition is Remanded
01-31-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
PAUL G MAUGHAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
cheril
Prosecutor: VEERU-COLLINGS, PADMA
Defendant not present

Video
Tape Number:

Video

Tape Count: 10:47

Based on the defendant and defense counsel not appearing for todays
hearing, court orders the appeal dismissed and remanded back to
Justice Court.
02-09-06 Note: INCOURT NOTE minutes modified.
02-09-06 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is DENNIS M FUCHS
02-09-06 Note: Clerk mailed contents of file to the Salt Lake City
Justice Court.
02-22-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
02-22-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
03-16-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.25
03-16-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.25
03-22-06 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Appeal from Justice
Court (URCrp 39 (g) (1) & (URCP Rule 60 (b) (1) ) (Order not
attached)
03-30-06 Filed: Letter from the defendant
03-30-06 Filed: Letter from the deft
04-11-06 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY
Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN
Clerk: cheril
The court finds good cause to reinstate the defendant's appeal and
based on there being no objection to defense motion by the city,
the court grants defense motion to reinstate his appeal.

Judge PAUL G MAUGHAN
04-11-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 055900311 ID 6590035
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 04/25/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
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450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN
04-11-06 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on April 25, 2006 at 09:00 AM in
Third Floor - W37 with Judge MAUGHAN.
04-11-06 Note: Based on the appeal in this case being reinstated, clerk
spoke with Marian at the Salt Lake City Justice Court and she
is going to send file back to Third District.
04-13-06 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE rescheduled on May 22, 2006 at 01:30 PM
Reason: Conflict in attorney schedule.
04-13-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 055900311 ID 6593168
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.
Date: 05/22/2006
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN
The reason for the change is Conflict in attorney schedule
04-13-06 Note: Clerk received a call from Mr. Archuleta's Office,
advising the court that he has a conflict with hearing date set
on 4-25-06 @ 9:00. Clerk scheduled new date and told them to
advise the deft of date. Clerk sent the city notice of change.
04-14-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.25
04-14-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.25
Note: 3.00 cash tendered.
0.75 change given.
05-01-06 Filed: Defendant's First Supplemental Request for Discovery
(URCrimP Rule 16 (a) (5))
05-22-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
PAUL G MAUGHAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
cyndiac
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA
Video
Tape Number:

Video

Tape Count: 2:09

Defense counsel present, requesting a Motion to Suppress hearing.
MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 06/22/2006
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
45 0 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN
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05-22-06 Filed: Motion to Suppress Evidence
05-23-06 MOTION HEARING scheduled on June 22, 2006 at 01:30 PM in Third
Floor - W37 with Judge MAUGHAN.
06-22-06 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on July 13, 2006 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
06-22-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
PAUL G MAUGHAN
PRESENT
Clerk:
cyndiac
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA
Video
Tape Number:

Video

Tape Count: 1:43

Defense counsel present, advising the Court that he is ready to go
forward today, but the City's witness is not present. City motion
to continue. Defense counsel stipulates to continuance. Based on
no objection, motion granted. Matter referred to
Judge Fuchs for scheduling.
SCHEDULING CONF is scheduled.
Date: 07/13/2006
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 5
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
07-01-06 Judge FUCHS assigned.
07-13-06 MOTION SUPPRESS scheduled on August 10, 2006 at 01:30 PM in
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS.
07-13-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
C1e rk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
Video
Tape Number:

CD 42

Tape Count: 9-05-05

HEARING
Defendant appeared before the court for a scheduling conference.
This is an appeal from Justice Court. Counsel requests Motion
Suppress Hearing.
MOTION SUPPRESS is scheduled.
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Date: 08/10/2006
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 5
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS
08-10-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Judge:
DENNIS M FUCHS
PRESENT
Clerk:
valerieb
Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON W
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT M ARCHULETA
Video
Tape Number:

cd 45

Tape Count: 1:50 37

HEARING
TAPE: Cd 45
COUNT: 1:50 37
State's witness Mark Nichols sworn and examined
COUNT: 1:55 5
cross
COUNT: 2:09
City's arguments
COUNT: 2:11
Defense closing arguments
COUNT: 2:14
the court finds the officer is in the DUI mode, and renders its
decision as follows:
there was no probable cause for the officer to pull the defendant
over, the court finds no evidence for the stop and grants the
motion to suppress.
08-10-06 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed
08-10-06 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed
08-10-06 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is DENNIS M FUCHS
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